



Current developments in America's refugee laws feature two statutes
enacted several years ago: The Act of October 3, 19651 which amended
the Immigration and Nationality Act2 in a number of respects; and the Act
of November 2, 1966,3 the Cuban refugee admission measure. Two sec-
tions of the 1965 statute which concern refugees have been the subject of
recent litigation. These are Sections 203(a)(7) 4 and 243(h).5 Section
203(a)(7) provides for conditional entry of qualified refugees into the
United States, and for adjustment of status to that of permanent resident
for certain refugees already in the United States who could otherwise
qualify as conditional entrants. 6 It was intended to supersede, in large part,
*A.B.c.l. (Harvard), M.A. (Virginia), LL.B. (Boston Univ.); General Attorney, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice.
tThe views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily those
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Department of Justice.179 Stat. 912-- 15, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1965).
266 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
380 Stat. 1161 (1966).
479 Stat. 912, 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(7) (1965).
58 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. 1969), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1952).6The text is found as a seventh preference for immigrants and reads as follows: Condi-
tional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney General, pursuant to such
regulations as he may prescribe and in a number not to exceed 6 per centum of the number
specified in section 201(a)(ii), to aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Service
officer at an examination in any non-Communist or non-Communist dominated country, (A)
that (i) because of persecution or fear or persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion they have fled (1) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or
(11) from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or
unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion,
and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional
entry is made; or (b) that they are persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity as
defined by the President who are unable to return to their usual place of abode. For the
purpose of the foregoing the term "general area of the Middle East' means the area between
and including (I) Libya on the west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3) Pakistan on the east, and (4)
Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on the south: Provided, That immigrant visas in a number not
exceeding one-half the number specified in this paragraph may be made available, in lieu of
conditional entries of a like number, to such aliens who have been continuously physically
present in the United States for a period of at least two years prior to application for
adjustment of status."
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the parole provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 7 Section
243(h) contains provision for temporary relief from expulsion from the
United States by withholding deportation, and thereby affords an indirect
method for admission of refugees. 8 There are other means, under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, by which a refugee may be relieved from
expulsion. 9 But they are not limited to use in cases of refugees nor more
widely used in refugee cases than in other situations.
Act of October 3, 1965
Litigation under Section 203(a)(7) has been on three main points: (1) the
validity of the principle of "firm resettlement," that an alien fleeing from his
homeland to the United States shall not have resettled firmly in an in-
termediate country on his way to the United States; (2) the con-
stitutionality of Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act1 ° as a
bar to adjustment of status, by an alien crewman, within the proviso to
Section 203(a)(7); 11 and (3) the validity of 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a)1 2 which
7The parole provision is found in Section 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
(1952) and provides: "The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United
States, but such parole shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the
purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States."
See S. Rep. No. 748, Amending the Immigration and Nationality Act and for Other
Purposes, 89th Cong., I st Sess. 16- 17 (1965); Hearings Before Sub-Comm. No. I of House
Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 7, at 215 (1965) and U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3334- 35 (1965) for the distinction intended by Congress between conditional entry and
parole.
8See note 5, supra. In its present language, Section 243(h) reads: "The Attorney General
is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in
which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion or
public opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason."
The 1965 amendment substituted "persecution on account of race, religion or public
opinion" for "physical persecution."
9E.g., under Section 244 or Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1254 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1965) and 66 Stat. 217, 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(1952) respectively, which allow adjustment of status.
'°See note 9 supra.
"See note 6 supra.
12(1965). It read, at the time of the litigation under discussion: "Pursuant to agreements
entered into with the governments of the countries concerned, officers of the [Immigration and
Naturalization] Service are authorized to accept applications for conditional entry under
section 203(a)(7) of the Act in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and
Lebanon. Applications for conditional entry may be filed only by aliens who are physically
present withiA one of the designated countries."
On November I1, 1970 this regulation was amended to add Hong Kong as a location
where applications for conditional entry under Section 203(a)(7) might be entertained. See 35
Fed. Reg. 17322 (1970).
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provided that applications for benefits under Section 203(a)(7) may be
processed in any of seven countries-to the exclusion of the Far East.
At present, a split of authority exists on the validity of the principle of
firm resettlement.13 The Ninth Circuit has found no mandate in legislative
history, nor in agency decisions or practice, that an applicant for condi-
tional entry into the United States shall not have resettled firmly in an
intermediate country. 14 The Second Circuit has recognized the validity of
the principle of firm resettlement and, in Shen v. Esperdy15 upheld, on
appeal, the finding of the United States District Court 16 that Shen had
resettled firmly in Taiwan before he came to the United States. Thus, the
Court of Appeals concluded that he was barred rightly from conditional
entry into the United States.
Both Circuits examined legislative history on the point of firm resettle-
ment and reached different conclusions. Woo and Shen each entered the
United States after protracted stays in intermediate countries.' 7 The Ninth
Circuit negated the principle of firm resettlement after the court below had
determined that, on the facts, Woo had not resettled firmly in Hong
Kong.' 8 The Second Circuit gave substantial weight to agency practice and
to prior administrative and judicial opinions.' 9
In analyzing the legislative history of Section 203(a)(7), the Ninth Cir-
cuit found it significant that the term "firmly resettled" had, since 1957,
been deleted from legislation regarding refugees. The Second Circuit con-
sidered the 1957 and 1960 statutes,20 both of which had deleted the phrase,
as essentially ad hoc measures. The Second Circuit found that the language
of the present statute, Section 203(a)(7), that an applicant not be a national
of the country in which his application was made, did not vitiate the
principle of firm resettlement. It meant only that an applicant might not be
a national of one of the seven countries listed in 8 C.F.R. §235.9(a), in
which applications for conditional entry may be made. The Second Circuit
stated that an application, made within the proviso to Section 203(a)(7) by
13The cases which are the subject of discussion here are Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg,
419 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, -U.S.-(Oct. 19, 1970) and Peter Chow Lung
Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
14Woo v. Rosenberg, supra note 13. "Agency" means the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service.
15See note 13 supra.
16Peter Chow Lung Shen v. Esperdy, 68 Civil 3331 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1969).17Both fled the mainland of China, Shen in 1948, Woo in 1953. Woo sojourned for seven
years in Hong Kong; Shen stayed nine years in Taiwan.
18See Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 295 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Calif. 1968).
19See e.g. Min Chin Wu v. Fullilove, 282 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Calif. 1968) and Board of
Immigration Appeals decisions cited in Shen v. Esperdy, supra note 13.20Respectively, the Act of Sept. II, 1957 (Refugee-Escapee Act), 71 Stat. 639, and the
Act of July 14, 1960 (Refugee Fair Share Law), 74 Stat. 504.
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an alien, like Shen or Woo, who was already in the United States, was
governed by 8 C.F.R. §245.421 and not by 8 C.F.R. §235.9.
The two latter points, noted earlier, on Section 203(a)(7) were litigated
recently in Luen Kwan Fu v. Immigration and Naturalization Service22
which, as the Second Circuit indicated, was governed by a prior decision in
the same Circuit, Tai Mui v. Esperdy.23 The agency determination 24 that
alien crewmen are ineligible to adjust their status within the proviso to
Section 203(a)(7) and the regulation 25 providing overseas locations-to the
exclusion of the Far East-to process applications for conditional entry
were found not unconstitutional by the United States Court of Appeals.
The same Court, in Tai Mui v. Esperdy in 1966, decided that adjustment
of status within the proviso to Section 203(a)(7) is governed by the general
requirement for adjustment of status, prescribed by Section 245.26 Section
245 expressly bars alien crewmen from adjusting their status to that of
permanent residents. 27 The Second Circuit, in Tai Mui, found it significant
that, in amending the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965, Congress
deleted the bar to alien crewmen who entered the United States on or
before June 30, 1964 obtaining suspension of deportation,2 8 but did not lift
the bar to adjustment by crewmen under Section 245.
In the stage of agency decision, the District Director had turned down
21(1969). This regulation recites that: "The provision of section 245 of the Act and this
Part [245] shall govern the adjustment of status provided for in the proviso to section
203(a)(7) of the Act. An alien who claims he is entitled to a preference status pursuant to the
proviso to section 203(a)(7) shall execute and attach to his application for adjustment of
status, Form 1-590A, Application for Classification as a Refugee under the Proviso to Section
203(a)(7), Immigration and Nationality Act. The determination as to whether an alien is
entitled to the claimed preference status shall be made by the district director; no appeal shall
lie from his determination."
22131 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1970).
23371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017. Fu, like Tai Mui, was an
overstay Chinese crewman who had remained in the United States illegally for several years
prior to his application for adjustment of status.
2l.e. determination that adjustment of status within the proviso to Section 203(a)(7) was
governed by Section 245.
258 C.F.R. §235.9(a).
2 6Cf. Wong Pak Yan v. Rinaldi, 427 F.2d 15-1 U.S. (Oct. 12, 1970), (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied which held that 8 C.F.R. § 245.4 is not unconstitutional. For the text of that regulation
see note 2 1, supra.
27See also 8 C.F.R. §245.1(a) (1965). Section 245(a) declares: "The status of an alien,
other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations
as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the
alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant
visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa
is immediately available to him at the time his application is approved."28See Section 244(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 79 Stat. 918, 8 U.S.C.
§1254(f) (1965), amending 8 U.S.C. §1254(f) (1962).
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the Section 203(a)(7) application of Tai Mui while, in the case of Luen
Kwan Fu, the Special Inquiry Officer ordered deportation of the alien
crewman, considering it unnecessary to delay until the District Director
should surely have denied the crewman's application for conditional entry.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the failure of the Act or the regulations to
provide that the District Director first act, under 8 C.F.R. §245.1(d),2 9 on
Fu's application, was not an abridgment of a constitutional right.
In both Tai Mui and Luen Kwan Fu the challenge to the regulation, 8
C.F.R. §235.9,30 as arbitrary and invalid, was turned aside by the Second
Circuit: statistics on the admission of conditional entrants from the Far
East did not warrant establishment of a center in that area to process
applications under Section 203(a)(7).
Section 243(h), enacted as part of the original Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, provides for withholding of deportation-at the discretion of the
Attorney General. 31 This section, in affording temporary relief from ex-
pulsion from the United States for those refugees who qualify, offers, in
effect, temporary admiiission to this country. So far, relief has been granted
sparingly under this section. 32 Although much litigation has arisen over
agency denial of relief under this section, the courts have generally upheld
agency determinations. 33 The often-time lengthy litigation over denials has
itself afforded many aliens extended sojourns in the United States.
291965. It recites, in pertinent part: ". . . An alien who claims preference status under the
proviso to section 203(a)(7) of the Act is not eligible for the benefits of section 245 of the Act
and as provided in §245.4, unless the district director has approved the alien's Application for
Classification as a Refugee under the Proviso to Section 203(a)(7), Immigration and Nation-
ality Act."
Note that 8 C.F.R. §245.4 makes the District Director's decision final on an adjustment
of status within the proviso to Section 203(a)(7). For references to 8 C.F.R. §245.4 see notes
21 and 26 supra. In Fu's case the explicit bar of Section 245 to adjustment of status by
crewmen was paramount.30 For the text of 8 C.F.R. § 239(a) see note 12, supra. Noted also, at that point, is the
recent amendment to the regulation.
31For the text of Section 243(h) see note 8, supra.32Staff of Sub-Comm. No. 1, House Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, with Amendments and Notes on Related Laws and Summaries
of Pertinent Judicial Decisions 244 (Comm. Print 1969); Evans, Political Refugees and The
United States Immigration Laws: A Case Note, 62 AM. J. INT'L. L. 924 (1968); Evans, The
Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 31NT'L LAWYER 242, 253
( 1969); cf. 2 Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, 8-115 & 8-116 (Rev. ed.
1967).3 3 lmmigration and Nationality Act, supra note 32; Evans, op. cit., 62 AM. J. INT'L. L.,
supra note 32, at 924- 26; 1 Gordon & Rosenfield, op. cit., supra note 32 at 5-123. One writer
ascribes the paucity of decisions for the alien in Section 243(h) appeals to the following
situation: "The bare facts of the case, the weight of the alien's evidence, the balance between
this evidence and the Government's, or the court's sensitivity to the foreign policy implica-
tions of the case, all militate against a decision for the alien." Evans, op. cit., 3 INT'L.
LAWYER, supra note 32 at 242.
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In a recent significant case, concerning Section 243(h), Kovac v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service,3 4 the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower
court decision for the Government.
Kovac entered the United States as a crewman, overstayed and sought
relief from deportation under Section 243(h). Relief was denied by the
Special Inquiry Officer, and denial affirmed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals. The Special Inquiry Officer based his decision on the alien's
claim of possible persecution in Yugoslavia in the form of prosecution for
deserting his ship, a Yugoslav vessel. But the alien was found to have
claimed before the agency, that he had encountered earlier discrimination
against him in Yugoslavia as a person of Hungarian extraction who had
refused to inform on other Hungarians and had lost jobs as a consequence.
The Ninth Circuit found, as well, that he claimed return to Yugoslavia
would result in physical abuse and long confinement due to his open
defiance of Communism in having sought asylum in the United States.
The agency decision, according to the Court of Appeals, was based on
erroneous standards employed: (1) the court said fear of persecution was
for having sought asylum, not for having merely deserted his ship; (2) the
consequence of deportation was judged according to what persecution had
occurred in the cases of other seamen who had sought asylum in the
United States and not what could occur to this alien and (3) the possibility
of persecution was determined according to whether this alien could obtain
some employment later in Yugoslavia, and not whether the alien might
suffer economically for his political opinions.3 5 The Court of Appeals
indicated that it believed the alien might have been handicapped at the
Service hearing by lack of knowledge of English.
In another recent case on the same section, Muskardin v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service,36 the Service avoided the pitfalls of the Kovac
case3 7 in employing erroneous standards for a decision, and the court found
no abuse of discretion in the administrative denial of withholding deporta-
tion. Muskardin, too, was an overstay Yugoslav crewman. He alleged,
before the Service, possible persecution upon deportation to his homeland
34407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).35The Court said that the Service erroneously employed a standard which was valid
before the 1965 amendment of Section 243(h) which changed the wording of that section. See
note 8 supra. See further I Gordon & Rosenfield, op. cit., supra note 32 at 5-122.
For a recent case in which the petitioner attempted to rely on the Kovac case see
Shkukani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. F.2d (8th Cir., Jan. 4, 197 1).
36415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969).37See Evans, op. cit., 3 INT'L. LAWYER, note 32 supra at 230-31 on requirements for
agency procedure in Section 243(h) proceedings and 2 Gordon & Rosenfield, op. cit., note 32
supra, at 8-114 on procedure in Section 243(h) cases.
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because, as a Catholic, he disliked Communism, and because he could be
prosecuted for jumping ship.3 8 Unlike Kovac, however, he had not pre-
viously been in difficulty with the Yugoslav regime.
The Act of October 3, 1965 has provided a haven in the United States
for a number of refugees from the recent political turmoil in Czechoslova-
kia. It is likely that over 9,000 Czech refugees were admitted, or otherwise
permitted to remain, in the United States by the end of 1969.39 As of
October 1, 1969, 4,032 Czech refugees had obtained approval of appli-
cations for conditional entry into the United States. 40
Act of November 2, 1966
The Act of November 2, 196641 was passed to afford, to Cuban refugees
who met certain requirements, 42 benefits in the form of adjustment of
status to that of permanent resident in the United States from parolee or
c.ier non-immigrant status, and a "roll-back" of thirty months in setting
the effective date for commencement of permanent residence in the cases
both of those Cuban refugees eligible to adjust their status and of those
who were already permanent residents.4 3
Recently, several agency decisions have been handed down which
interpret parts of the above statute. In Matter of Milian,44 the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ruled that the wife of a Cuban native and
citizen need not herself be a Cuban native or citizen, nor have married a
Cuban native or citizen, prior to her arrival in the United States5 in
order for her to come within the Act.
38Cf. I Gordon & Rosenfiled, op. cit., note 32 supra at 5-126 regarding treatment of the
argument against deportation of an anti-Communist Catholic to Yugoslavia.39See Findings and Recommendations of Senate Sub-Comm. on Judiciary, 9 1 st Cong.,
Ist Sess., U.S. Assistance to Refugees Throughout the World 78 (Comm. Print 1969).
For an administrative holding that refugee status, in the case of a Czech applicant for
conditional entry, originated after departure from Czechoslovakia and, in fact, during sojourn
in the United States as a visitor at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, see
Matter of Zedkova, Int. Dec. #2062 (Reg. Commr. 1970).40See note 39, supra, at 77.
4 1See note 3 supra.4 2The alien must have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States
subsequent to January 1, 1959; been physically present in the United States for at least two
years prior to adjustment and eligible to receive an immigrant visa, and admissible to the
United States for permanent residence.
43The record date is to be made, in the cases of those adjusting status, thirty months prior
to the filing of an application for adjustment or the date of the alien's last arrival in the United
States, whichever date is later and, in the cases of those already permanent residents, thirty
months prior to November 2, 1966-the date of the Act-or the date the alien originally
arrived in the United States as a parolee or non-immigrant whichever date is later.
"Int. Dec. #2023 (Acting Reg. Commr. 1970).
41n this case, the marriage occurred after the spouse's adjustment of status.
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In Matter of Costarelli,46 the Board of Immigration Appeals decided
that, under this Act, an alien crewman who was not a native or citizen of
Cuba, but who was the spouse of a Cuban native and citizen, might,
unlike a crewman seeking adjustment under Section 245 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act,47 adjust his status.
4int. Dec. #2047 (B.I.A. 1970).
47Under Section 245(a) an alien crewman may not adjust his status, but this decision has
ruled that adjustment under the Act of November 2, 1966 is not governed by Section 245(a).
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